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I. INTRODUCTION
There are two divergent views on the role of public sector collective bar-
gaining in American law. The first (and generally older) view is that public
sector collective bargaining undermines democratic government, allowing
organized employees to interfere with the administration of the law for their
own personal benefit at the expense of the general population and taxpayer.1
Under this view, courts have characterized public employee union membership
as “subversive,” “inconsistent with . . . discipline,” “a direct violation of the
constitution,” and “detrimental to the general welfare” to rationalize the
enforcement of public sector yellow-dog contracts and discriminatory dis-
charges.2 On the question of whether legislatures can either allow or prohibit
public sector collective bargaining, judges adhering to this negative view of
public sector collective bargaining have found that it is an unconstitutional
interference with freedom of contract or an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power.3
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1 See generally Joseph E. Slater, Public Workers: Government Employee Unions, the Law,
and the State, 1900–1962 (2004); Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor
Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1369 (2009).
2 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Magee, 122 A. 234, 234 (Pa. 1923); Perez v. Bd. of Police
Comm’rs, 178 P.2d 537, 545 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
3 See, e.g., McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503, 505–06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (government’s
freedom of contract allows state to prohibit public employee organization), superseded by
statute as recognized in City of Round Rock v. Rodriguez, 317 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App.
2010); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Mo. 1947) (public sector collec-
tive bargaining constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of governmental power), overruled
by Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131 (Mo.
414
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The second view is that public sector collective bargaining is an essential
part of our democratic government. Under this view, collective bargaining is a
fundamental human right4 included in our cherished constitutional rights of free
speech and association,5 and an essential counterbalance to corporate interests
in a pluralistic society.6 Supporters would argue that, on the whole, public sec-
tor collective bargaining improves democratic outcomes and government
administration by giving workers a voice in the outcome.7 Public sector unions
represent important public policy interests in collective bargaining and legisla-
tive lobbying, and act as a check on government monopsony power in
employment.8
These countervailing views of public sector collective bargaining find rep-
resentation not only in legal doctrine and opinions, but also in the public policy
and economic arguments surrounding this debate. The detractors argue that
unions are merely labor cartels that are both inefficient and inequitable, raising
wages and benefits at the expense of consumers and taxpayers and imposing
2007). Although American courts now generally accept that it is not unconstitutional for a
state or locality to engage in collective bargaining with its employees, it is also generally
accepted that there is no constitutional right on the part of those employees to resort to
collective bargaining. See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S.
463, 464, 466 (1979); Seattle High Sch. Chapter No. 200 of the Am. Fed’n of Teachers v.
Sharples, 293 P. 994, 998 (Wash. 1930); Perez, 178 P.2d at 545–46. As a result, in the
United States, whether public employees have a right to collectively bargain, and the form of
that right, is largely a matter of federal and state legislation. See SLATER, supra note 1, at
82–95.
4 This right is spelled out in Article 23 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at 75 (Dec. 8, 1948), and in other international declarations of which the
United States is a signatory, such as the 1998 International Labour Organization’s Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work, International Labor Conference, 86th Sess. (June 18, 1998),
available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang—en/index
.htm.
5 See Catherine Phillips, Note, The Lost Democratic Institution of Petitioning: Public
Employee Collective Bargaining as a Constitutional Right, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 652,
682–85 (2012).
6 See Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE
L.J. 1156, 1159 (1974); DAVID LEWIN ET AL., EMP’T POLICY RESEARCH NETWORK & LABOR
& EMP’T RELATIONS ASS’N, GETTING IT RIGHT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS FROM RESEARCH ON PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 28
(2011), available at http://www.employmentpolicy.org/sites/www.employmentpolicy.org
/files/EPRN%20PS%20draft%203%2016%2011%20PM%20FINALtk-ml4%20edits.pdf;
Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A Per-
spective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 305 (2013); Kazutoshi
Koshiro, Does Public Sector Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy in Japan?, 34 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 307, 344 (2013).
7 David Lewin, Public Employment Relations: Confronting the Issues, 12 INDUS. REL. 309,
318–21 (1973). See also DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 424 (1970). For a discussion of these issues on a comparative basis, see the
symposium edition of the Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, Symposium, Public
Sector Collective Bargaining and the Distortion of Democracy: Do Public Sector Unions
Have “Too Much” Power?, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 245 (2013).
8 See Summers, supra note 6, at 1159–61.
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inefficient and inflexible work rules.9 Public employee collective bargaining is
doubly bad because it often exploits a government monopoly on services and
gives public employee interests an elevated status in public policy debates.10
These views have found ready representation in the recent debates over legisla-
tion to prohibit or restrict public sector collective bargaining in Wisconsin,
Ohio, and Indiana, among other states.11 On the other hand, the proponents of
public sector collective bargaining argue that public employee voice in the pro-
vision of government services is valuable and improves the provision of gov-
ernment services and administration of the law.12 Public sector unions
represent important public policy interests in collective bargaining and legisla-
tive lobbying, and act as a check on narrow taxpayer interests and government
monopsony power in employment.13 Moreover, unions in both the private and
the public sectors foster a healthy middle class, promote greater equality in the
distribution of income and wealth, and promote the representation of the views
of workers in legislative debates.14
Many of the broader claims of these two views are subject to empirical
analysis. One of the goals of public sector unions is to raise employee wages
and benefits over what they would have been in the absence of a union; but are
they raised above comparable levels in the private sector at the expense of
taxpayers, or do they promote comparable wages that attract good public ser-
vants and long-run administrative interests rather than short-term budget cut-
ting interests? Do public sector unions impose work rules and restrictions that
interfere with the provision of government services, or do they provide an
employee voice that improves government services and the administration of
the law? In this article, I will present an outline of the economic arguments
both for and against public sector unions, and the empirical evidence support-
ing or refuting those arguments. My intent is to provide an empirical context
for the larger debate regarding public policy with respect to public sector col-
lective bargaining, and the larger constitutional debate over this institution.
9 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
228–47 (1980); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1365–67, 1382 (1983); Henry C. Simons,
Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 1, 12 (1944).
10 Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1108 (1969). See also Jeffrey H. Keefe, A Recon-
sideration and Empirical Evaluation of Wellington’s and Winter’s, The Unions and the Cit-
ies, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 (2013) (examining the empirical basis for Wellington
and Winter’s arguments).
11 JOSEPH E. SLATER, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, THE ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: REAL HARMS AND IMAGINARY BENEFITS 1–4 (2011), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/the-assault-on-public-sector-collective-bar
gaining-real-harms-and-imaginar.
12 BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 7 (“Without union efforts, workers and low-income groups
would have little organized political support, and their interests would be more vulnerable to
the pressure of other powerful groups.”).
13 Summers, supra note 6, at 1159–61.
14 See BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 7; John F. Burton, Jr. & Charles Krider, The Role and
Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 430–32 (1970); Lewin,
supra note 7.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ207.txt unknown Seq: 4 30-APR-14 10:42
Spring 2014] UNDERMINING OR PROMOTING? 417
II. A PRIMER ON THE STATE AS AN ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL EMPLOYER:
DIFFERENT IS GOOD, AND EXPECTED!
Regardless of whether public employees are organized or not, economic
theory suggests that there should be some predictable differences between the
terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by the typical public sector
employee and those enjoyed by the typical private sector employee, given the
requirements of most government jobs and various characteristics of the gov-
ernment as an employer.
First, there are important demographic differences between public and pri-
vate employees that have to be taken into account in accurately comparing their
relative compensation. As shown in Table 1, on average, public employees
have more years of education, more years of experience (age), work fewer
hours and are more likely to be female or Black (but not Hispanic) than private
sector employees. It is vital to take account of the educational differences
between public and private sector workers in comparing their wages and bene-
fits. Many government positions such as teacher, civil engineer, registered
nurse, and various administrators, require at least a bachelor’s degree, while
government-employed professors, lawyers, and doctors must complete
advanced or professional degrees in order to do their job competently.15 As a
result, while only twenty-five to thirty percent of private sector employees have
at least a bachelor’s degree, over half of public employees have at least a bach-
elor’s degree.16 In order to recruit educated people into public sector jobs, these
employees have to be compensated for their investment in education;17 thus
one would expect that, because government workers are, on average, more edu-
cated than private sector employees, they should be paid more, on average, than
private sector employees.18 Similarly, one should also take account of the fact
that public employees often work fewer hours and have more years of work
experience than private sector employees.19 The detractors of teachers have
made much of the fact that most work on nine or ten month contracts and, to
15 JOHN SCHMITT, THE WAGE PENALTY FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH 4 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents
/publications/wage-penalty-2010-05.pdf.
16 KEITH A. BENDER & JOHN S. HEYWOOD, OUT OF BALANCE? COMPARING PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTOR COMPENSATION OVER 20 YEARS, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCEL-
LENCE & NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. 7 (2010), available at http://slge.org/wp-content
/uploads/2011/12/Out-of-Balance_FINAL-REPORT_10-183.pdf (noting that only 22.6 % of
private sector workers have at least a bachelor’s degree, while 47.9% of public sector work-
ers have at least a bachelor’s degree).
17 Craig Olson, The Battle Over Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Wisconsin and Else-
where, EMP’T. POLICY RESEARCH NETWORK (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.employmentpolicy
.org/topic/402/op-ed/battle-over-public-sector-collective-bargaining-wisconsin-and-else
where.
18 LEWIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 4. Studies that fail to take account of this fact fall subject
to what is known as “Simpson’s Paradox”: that although average compensation of all public
sector workers is higher than the average compensation of all private sector workers, the
public sector workers might be paid less at each level of educational achievement. See
BENDER & HEYWOOD, supra note 16, at 5–6.
19 JEFFREY KEEFE, ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER #276, DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF
THE OVERCOMPENSATED PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 10 (2010), available at http://www.epi.org/files
/page/-/pdf/bp276.pdf.
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give them their due, one would rationally expect that these teachers would be
paid less than comparable private sector employees who worked year round.20
The fact that public employees currently are, on average, older and have more
years of work experience than private sector employees is probably due to
increased growth in state jobs during the 1950s and 60s.21 One would expect
that employees with more years of job experience would be compensated more,
and this fact should be taken into account in comparing private and public
compensation. Finally, although theoretically there should be no difference in
compensation based on gender, race, or ethnicity, historically women and
minority groups have done better in public employment.22 It is at least interest-
ing to control for systematic differences between private and public compensa-
tion based on race, ethnicity, and gender, although in this case lower wages in
the private sector may be an indication of discrimination.
TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE, STATE, AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES
(2008 AND 2009)23
Private State Local State & Local
Demographics
Number (Millions) 103.2 6.0 10.7 16.7
Annual Hours Worked24 2197 — — 2156
Median Age (Years) 40 43 44 44
Education (%)
Less Than High School 8.5 1.9 2.8 2.5
High School 31.1 17.9 21.1 19.9
Some College 30.6 27.1 26.5 26.7
College Degree 20.9 27.5 27.4 27.4
Advanced Degree 8.9 25.6 22.3 23.5
Gender, Race, Ethnicity (%)
Women 46.2 59.1 60.8 60.2
Black25 9.6 13.4 11.5 12.2 (est)
Hispanic26 17.1 8.3 10.8 9.8 (est)
20 Joel, Critics Claim Teaching Is a Part-Time Job at Full Pay Wages, TEACHING COMMU-
NITY, http://teaching.monster.com/careers/articles/8021-critics-claim-teaching-is-a-part-time
-job-at-full-pay-wages (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
21 KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 83
(2009).
22 Joseph G. Altonji & Robert Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor Market, in HANDBOOK
OF LABOR ECONOMICS (O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds. 1999); Martin Asher and Joel
Popkin, The Effect of Gender and Race Differentials on Public-Private Wage Comparisons:
A Study of Postal Workers, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 16 (1984-1985).
23 SCHMITT, supra note 15, at 3 tbl.1 (analysis of CEPR extract (version 1.5) of 2009 CPS
ORG).
24 KEEFE, supra note 19, at 10 tbl.5 (analysis of 2009 CPS data for private and public
employees).
25 BENDER & HEYWOOD, supra note 16, at 7 tbl.1 (2008 CPS data).
26 Id.
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Second, the state is a relatively large employer, and large employers are
good at bearing risk because they have a large number of employees over
which risk can be pooled; they also enjoy economies of scale in the coverage of
risk.27 As a result, large employers can more efficiently offer benefits such as
health insurance and pensions that insulate employees from risk, and it is pre-
dictable that benefits would constitute a larger percent of the employees’ com-
pensation package for large employers like the state.28 Because of its relative
insulation from market fluctuations and its high degree of credit-worthiness, the
state is a particularly good risk-bearer, even among large employers. Thus it is
predictable that, even in comparison with other large employers, the state
would offer to bear or insure employee risk through the provision of various
benefits in exchange for relatively lower wages. Accordingly, one would expect
that the typical public employee compensation package would include a higher
percentage of compensation in benefits such as healthcare and pensions, and a
lower percent in upfront wages, in comparison with the compensation packages
of typical private employees.29
Third, the demand for government services is more predictable than the
demand for most private businesses and thus, as an employer, the state proba-
bly does not place as high a premium on having flexibility to lay off employees
as do private businesses. A rational state would want to maintain public
employment in hard economic times as a counter-cyclical check against reces-
sion.30 Indeed, the demand for many government services increases in hard
economic times,31 so a state might actually want to employ more workers
rather than fewer when the economy contracts. As a result, one would expect
that, rationally, the state would want to offer job stability to employees in
exchange for lower wages, and one would expect that state employees would
enjoy greater job security than comparable private sector employees.32 Indeed,
historically, the necessity of protecting valuable state employees and their posi-
tions from political cronyism or patronage has required strict protection under
civil service laws.33 The rational intertemporal bargain between the state and its
employees would be that state employment and wages would not increase as
fast as those of private employees in good economic times, but they would also
be maintained or at least not decrease as fast as those of private sector employ-
27 See William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Employer Size and Compensation: The
Role of Worker Characteristics, 26 APPLIED ECON. 897, 897 (1994).
28 See LEWIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 7; BENDER & HEYWOOD, supra note 16, at 15. Bene-
fits are also generally higher for more educated workers. Since public workers are generally
more educated than private sector workers, this would also argue in favor of higher benefits
for state employees. Id.
29 See LEWIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 4.
30 See Matissa Hollister, Employment Stability in the U.S. Labor Market: Rhetoric Versus
Reality, 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 305, 313 (2011).
31 How Have State Governments Fared During the Recent Recession?, FED. RES. BANK OF
S.F. (Oct. 2010), http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2010/october/re
cession-state-government.
32 LEWIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
33 For a discussion on state employees and patronage, see generally Bryan A. Schneider,
Note, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night: The Unquiet Death of Political Patronage,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 511.
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ees in bad economic times.34 The predictability of government work might also
allow the government to offer expected hours of work for public employees
that are more predictable than those for comparable employees in the private
sector, once again with a commensurate deduction in wages.
Thus, even in an atomistic competitive labor market, without unions or
political advocacy, one would expect that public employee compensation,
including the value of both wages and benefits, would on average be higher
than that for all private employees (because of the greater average educational
requirements of public employment jobs), but that the compensation package
for public employees would include relatively lower wages and higher benefits,
including job security, than that for private sector employees. Simple analyses
which assume that any difference between the compensation packages of public
and private employees in either amount or wage and benefit mix is a sign of
government waste and inefficiency or political favoritism are simply wrong.35
Because of the differences in the optimal compensation package for public and
private employees, the government will tend to attract employees who are par-
ticularly risk-averse as well as those who particularly enjoy the type of work
the government has to offer, and thus for whom the government’s proffered
trade-off of benefits and wages is a particularly good deal. Therefore, people
who are relatively risk-averse and place a lower value on income will tend to
go into government work while people who are relatively risk-seeking and put
a high value on income will tend to go into the private sector.36 However,
taking account of these differences in preferences, in order to attract people of
comparable skills to forgo private sector opportunities and enter and remain in
government employment, the government will have to offer public employees a
wage and benefits package that, over the course of their career, is equal in
expected value to what they would have received in a career in the private
sector. If the government offers a less attractive package, it will attract less
talented workers and lose its more talented workers to the private sector.
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE TWO VIEWS OF UNIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN ECONOMICS
A. Public Employee Unions as Labor Cartels and Special Interest Groups
The simple economic analysis of unions, in either the private or public
sector, is that they are labor cartels that impose on employers wage demands
and other terms and conditions of employment that are both inefficient and
34 See Don Bellante & Albert N. Link, Are Public Sector Workers More Risk Averse Than
Private Sector Workers?, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 408, 408–09 (1981).
35 For examples of poor analyses of public employee wages and benefits that are simply
wrong, see Dennis Cauchon, Benefits Widen Public, Private Workers’ Pay Gap, USA
TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2009-04-09-compensation_N
.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2009, 2:23 AM) (failure to account for educational differences);
Editorial Board, Squealing About the Income Gap, SUN J. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.sun
journal.com/node/287310 (failure to account for educational differences).
36 See Bellante & Link, supra note 34, at 411–12.
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inequitable.37 Under the simple neo-classical analysis, such labor cartels cause
inefficient production and consumption, unemployment, and a displacement of
workers from organized work to unorganized work, depressing wages there.38
They are also inequitable because employee wage increases come at the
expense of consumers or taxpayers who are not necessarily any wealthier than
public employees.39
This simple analysis is presented in Figure 1. Figure 1(a) represents the
organized labor market where the vertical axis measures the employees’ wages,
the horizontal axis measures the number of full-time employees employed, the
solid downward-sloping curve labeled D represents the employers’ labor
demand curve, and the solid upward-sloping curve labeled S represents the
employees’ labor supply curve. Figure 1(b) represents the unorganized labor
market, with analogous demand and supply curves. Prior to the entry of the
union, both the organized and the unorganized markets are in equilibrium with
a competitive wage (Wc), a competitive level of employment (Nc), and supply
equals demand (S = D).40 Under the traditional analysis, when the union
organizes a sufficient number of employees in the relevant product market, it
imposes a monopoly wage on the employers in the organized market (Wu)
which the employers must pay to employ labor. Barriers to entry prevent the
organized employers from replacing the employees,41 and the employer
responds by moving up his demand curve, reducing employment from Nc to Nu.
The traditional analysis depicted in Figure 1 outlines inefficiencies and
inequity that the detractors have generally ascribed to collective bargaining. In
response to the union wage, the employer accomplishes the decrease in
employment by reducing production and substituting capital for labor in the
production process, resulting in production inefficiency.42 The higher union
wage also results in unemployment because more workers (Ns) would like to
work at the union wage than the employers are willing to employ (Nu). As
shown in Figure 1, some of these workers (Nc - Nu) seek employment in the
unorganized labor market shown in Figure 1(b), pushing out the labor supply
37 See FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 247; Epstein, supra note 9, at 1365–66;
Simons, supra note 9, at 12.
38 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search
for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 453–54 (1992); HAROLD
W. DAVEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 306, 337 (4th ed. 1982).
39 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Arthur R. Traynor, Regulating Unions and Collective
Bargaining, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 96, 105 (Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt et al. eds., 2009); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 458.
40 For the standard presentation of this analysis, see RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S.
SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 450–52 (11th ed. 2012).
41 Critics argue that, in the public sector, there is often a government-maintained monopoly
on the provision of government services. This monopoly protects union monopoly wages
from being bid down by competition. JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND., BACK-
GROUNDER NO. 2275, WHAT UNIONS DO: HOW LABOR UNIONS AFFECT JOBS AND THE ECON-
OMY 1, 3 (2009), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/what
-unions-do-how-labor-unions-affect-jobs-and-the-economy.
42 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 40, at 450, 474–75, 511–12; BARRY T. HIRSCH &
JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS: NEW APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE
21–22, 181 (1986).
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curve in that market from S to S′ and depressing wages from Wc to W′c.43
Moreover, the decrease in production by the organized firms and the increase in
the organized employees’ wage results in an increase in the product price to the
consumer or taxpayer. This leads to “consumption inefficiency” because the
consumers or taxpayers will now buy too little of the good relative to other
goods.44 Using this model, it is commonly argued that the increase in union
wages is inequitable since it comes at the expense of consumers and non-union
workers who are probably not significantly richer than the union employees.45
Finally, critics argue that public sector unions use political pressure to maintain
the product market monopoly and pressure public employers to accede to union
demands. Drawing on public choice theory, these critics argue that public
employees are a narrow interest group that can gain personal benefits at the
expense of the larger electorate.46
FIGURE 1: THE SIMPLE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL OF UNIONS
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Based on the above analysis, conservatives argue that public employee
unions impose wages and benefits that are higher than those enjoyed by compa-
rable private sector employees who are not organized.47 These higher wages
and benefits raise the cost of government services and cause inefficient produc-
tion and consumption.48 Higher wages and benefits are also inequitable
because they come at the expense of taxpayers who may not be as wealthy as
43 This movement of employees from an organized to an unorganized job market is gener-
ally known as the “displacement effect.” Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38; DAVEY ET AL., supra
note 38, at 306; EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 40 at 474–75.
44 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 40, at 453, 474. See also HIRSCH & ADDISON,
supra note 42, at 22, 181.
45 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 458.
46 See NICK ADNETT & PETER DAVIES, MARKETS FOR SCHOOLING: AN ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS 7–9 (2002) (explaining public choice theory in the context of public schools); DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 473 (2003).
47 See JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND., BACKGROUNDER NO. 2522, TIME TO RESTORE
VOTER CONTROL: END THE GOVERNMENT-UNION MONOPOLY 4 (2011), available at http://
thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2522.pdf.
48 Id. at 7.
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the public employees.49 Moreover, public employee collective bargaining
undermines our democratic government by establishing a special interest group
with an interest in gaining wages and benefits at the expense of ordinary tax-
payers.50 These special interest groups undermine the working of our demo-
cratic government because they have a concentrated interest in rent-seeking at
the expense of the larger electorate’s interest in the efficient provision of gov-
ernment services.51 As a solution to these problems, conservatives have argued
that we should prohibit collective bargaining in the public sector (and in the
private sector too).52
Even before we get to the empirical question of whether public sector
employees (and, in particular, organized public employees) are overpaid, there
are some logical objections that can be raised to the conservative account. It
seems a gross exaggeration to say that public sector unions in the United States
establish a labor cartel that dictates wage and benefit increases. Even before the
recent round of state statutes limiting or doing away with collective bargaining
rights, only thirty-four states had comprehensive public sector collective bar-
gaining laws, and only eight had statutes allowing any public employees even a
limited right to strike.53 There is no right to strike among federal employees,54
and strikes in violation of this stricture have met with wholesale termination of
the striking federal employees.55 For the vast majority of American public sec-
tor employees, if there is any right to collectively bargain, it is more a right to
consultation with a possible resort to neutral fact-finding or arbitration on dis-
puted topics. The primary benefits to American public employees from collec-
tive bargaining are their association with other employees with similar
interests, a First Amendment right, and the opportunity to have signed contracts
on their terms and conditions of employment that are enforceable for a period
of time, generally two to four years—most often two.
Secondly, private outsourcing has proven in many cases to be a poor alter-
native to the provision of public goods and services with public employees.
There have been some notable failures in public outsourcing of late. In Penn-
sylvania, the owners of private youth detention facilities bribed judges to fill
their cells and work programs, resulting in the wrongful incarceration of hun-
dreds of young people and the death of at least one young man, Edward
Kenzakowski.56 The obvious lesson from this case seems to be that it is very
49 See id. at 4, 7.
50 Id. at 7.
51 Id. at 3.
52 See generally Judith Davidoff, Walker’s Plan to End Bargaining Has Deep Roots in
GOP, CAP TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt
-and-politics/article_b4b509b4-3ed0-11e0-b97e-001cc4c03286.html.
53 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 21, at 84–85.
54 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7) (2012). See Mark D. Roth & Jamison F. Grella, First Line Defend-
ers as Second Class Citizens: Collective Bargaining Rights for TSA Employees and National
Security Make Good Bedfellows, 1 NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF 117, 122 (2010); Joseph A.
McCartin, Re-Framing US Labour’s Crisis: Reconsidering Structure, Strategy, and Vision,
LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL, Spring 2007, at 133, 138.
55 Bernard D. Meltzer & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion,
and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 731 (1983).
56
‘Kids for Cash’ Judge Gets 28 Years in Pennsylvania Bribery Case, GUARDIAN, Aug. 11,
2011, at 20, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/11/kids-for-cash
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dangerous to align the coercive power of the state with the private profit
motive. Private subcontracting was also extensively used in the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan because the wars had exhausted available government person-
nel.57 This outsourcing resulted in the deaths of American service people,58 the
failure of training programs that were at the core of the mission,59 and billions
of dollars in waste, graft, and fraud.60 The empirical evidence suggests that
early efforts at privatization in the 1970s and 80s yielded efficiencies, but at
least since the 1990s there has been no systematic relationship between priva-
tization and government savings.61 It seems that private companies and entre-
preneurs are better than public sector employees at rent-seeking, influencing
legislators, and “undermining” democratic processes. This is probably predict-
able within the context of the neoclassical model since the rents are more con-
centrated and less transparent in the profits of a private company than when a
public union lobbies for program improvements, better wages, and better work-
ing conditions in public collective bargaining agreements. This greater concen-
tration of rents in private contracting is also arguably less equitable than when
any benefits of lobbying are dispersed among many public employees. Blind
bidding of construction projects to private contractors has proven useful and
efficient, so private outsourcing can sometimes be useful, but it is a mistake to
assume that just because work is being done by a private contractor that public
services are being adequately and efficiently delivered. For the provision of
public goods that have to be paid out of the public purse, public employees
usually do a better job with less waste, graft, and fraud than what is lost as a
result of outsourcing to private companies.62
-judge-pennsylvania; Michael Rubinkam, Pa. Judge Guilty of Racketeering in Kickback
Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2011, 3:04 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff
-wires/20110219/us-courthouse-kickbacks/.
57 Jeremy Scahill, The Mercenary Revolution: Flush with Profits from the Iraq War, Mili-
tary Contractors See a World of Business Opportunities, INDYPENDENT (Aug. 10, 2007),
http://www.indypendent.org/2007/08/10/mercenary-revolution-flush-profits-iraq-war-mili
tary-contractors-see-world-business-opportunities; Daniel Schulman, Afghan Police Train-
ing: “An Unbelievably Incompetent Story”, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 16, 2010, 2:00 AM), http
://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/04/afghan-police-training-unbelievably-incompetent-story.
58 See U.S. Electrocution Deaths in Iraq Probed, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 2:42 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/01/iraq/main4223114.shtml.
59 Schulman, supra note 57.
60 Richard Lardner, Up to $60B in War Funds Said Wasted, YAHOO NEWS INDIA (Aug. 31,
2011), http://in.news.yahoo.com/ap-exclusive-60b-war-funds-said-wasted-210817969.html.
61 Keefe, supra note 10, at 254. See GEORGE A. BOYNE, PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UK AND THE USA 150, 165–67
(1998); GRAEME A. HODGE, PRIVATIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE
155–56 (2000).
62 See Hasan Saleem, How Outsourcing Affects the U.S. Economy, DIRECTORY J. (Apr. 16,
2013), http://www.dirjournal.com/business-journal/how-outsourcing-affects-the-us-econ
omy/. See also Outsourcing Statistics in Perspective, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 16,
2004), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/tax-reform/news/2004/03/16/639/outsourc
ing-statistics-in-perspective; Job Outsourcing Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, http://www.statis
ticbrain.com/outsourcing-statistics-by-country/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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B. Employee Voice at Work and in Our Democracy
The neoclassical analysis of unions as labor cartels is logically incomplete
and far too simple for such a complex phenomenon. The basic neoclassical
analysis ignores the benefits of efficient negotiations between the union and the
employer and the possibility of employer monopsony power. It would be irra-
tional for the union to dictate wages while the employer sets employment;
instead, the parties should rationally bargain over both wages and employment
to reach Pareto optimal agreements.63 In the case of employer monopsony
power, collective bargaining can move the parties to a more efficient level of
wages and employment.64 Moreover, it has been persuasively argued that col-
lective bargaining can raise efficiency by providing a role for employee voice
in the production process and the negotiation and enforcement of contract
terms.65 Employees, especially skilled professional employees like many public
employees, can provide useful input into the production process and act as use-
ful monitors of management performance in the workplace.66 Unions can also
be useful in negotiating efficient contract terms over public goods in the work-
place and enforcing efficient deals between employees and employers over
time.67 Finally, public employee unions can be useful in the political process,
representing the benefits of the programs in which they work and the under-
represented perspective of working Americans in general. As a result, far from
simply being an exercise in rent-seeking, the participation of public sector
unions in the political process makes an important contribution to pluralism in
our democracy.68
1. Pareto Optimal Bargaining
Unless one wants to assume that unions are entirely indifferent to the
unemployment of their members, the simple depiction of collective bargaining
in the neoclassical model in which the union sets the wage and the employer
responds by setting employment will not be Pareto optimal for the parties.
Although the employer’s labor demand curve gives the profit-maximizing
response to a market increase in wages, if the wage increase results from the
formation of a union that can bargain over both wages and employment, it can
be shown that the employer and union can negotiate a wage and employment
63 An outcome is Pareto optimal, if none of the concerned parties can be made better off
without making one worse off. Pareto optimality exists in a deal between two parties when
they have exhausted all efficient exchanges between them. GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECO-
NOMICS 435 (6th ed. 2013).
64 See infra text accompanying note 78.
65 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 8–9 (1984).
66 See Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Case
for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
871, 899 (2007); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American
Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 802 (2011); Dau-
Schmidt, supra note 38, at 431; Peter Kuhn, Union Productivity Effects and Economic Effi-
ciency, 6 J. LAB. RES. 229, 230 (1985).
67 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 431–32; Kuhn, supra note 66, at 230.
68 See Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, The Wisconsin Union Fight Isn’t About Benefits. It’s
About Labor’s Influence, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2011 (Sunday Outlook), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR2011030406264.html.
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agreement that specifies a higher level of employment and a lower wage that
both the employer and union will prefer to the employer’s labor demand
response.69 Certainly, if one were to assume that the parties bargain to maxi-
mize the monetary value of rents and productivity increases due to unioniza-
tion, one can demonstrate that the parties will seek to minimize the impact of
the union on product price and firm employment levels.70
To demonstrate this superior “bargaining solution,” I have redrawn in Fig-
ure 2 “the labor demand analysis” of Figure 1(a) and included some graphical
representations concerning the employer’s profitmaking opportunities and the
union’s preferences among different levels of wages and employment.71 Just
like in Figure 1(a), the vertical axis quantifies the employees’ wage, the hori-
zontal axis quantifies the number of full-time employees employed, the solid
downward-descending curve labeled D signifies the employer’s labor demand
curve and the solid upward sloping curve labeled S signifies the employees’
labor supply curve. However, I have also included employer isoprofit curves
P0, P1, and P2, which descend on each side of the labor demand curve. Each
isoprofit curve graphs wage and employment mixes that yield equivalent levels
of profit and they descend on either side of the firm’s demand curve because at
less optimal levels of employment the employer requires a lower wage to
achieve the same profits. Isoprofit curves that are lower in the graph (P2) spec-
ify a higher level of profits than those that are higher in the graph (P0) because
they signify lower wage levels for any given level of production.72 Additionally
seen in Figure 2 are the union’s indifference curves, U0 and U1. Each indiffer-
ence curve graphs wage and employment mixes that yield equal utility to the
union as a collective entity in choosing what level of wages and employment to
accept. Indifference curves that are further from the origin (U1) yield higher
utility than those that are closer to the origin (U0) because they signify higher
wage levels for any given level of employment.73
The superiority of the parties’ bargaining response to those set forth in the
neoclassical model can now be demonstrated.74 When the workers organize
and demand union wages, Wu, an employer’s labor demand response is to move
to point A and reduce the number of employees working to Nu. However, the
firm can achieve the same level of profits it would obtain at Wu and Nu, while
still increasing the union’s utility, by moving to the right along the firm’s
isoprofit curve P0 and agreeing to any point on P0 between A and C′. Similarly,
the union can achieve the same level of utility that it would achieve at Wu and
Nu, while still allowing the firm to achieve a higher level of profits, by moving
to the right from A along the union’s indifference curve U0 and agreeing to any
point on U0 between A and C″. The tangencies between the firm’s isoprofit
69 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 435.
70 Id. at 435–36.
71 Id. at 436.
72 Id. at 436–37 (“For any given wage, profit is maximized on the labor demand curve;
however, identical profits can be made with either more or less labor at a lower wage rate.
Accordingly, the isoprofit curves slope down on either side of the labor demand curve.”).
73 Id. at 437–38 (“Assuming that the union’s utility is an increasing function of both wages
and employment, the union’s indifference curves will be concave toward the origin as
depicted in Figure 2.”).
74 Id. at 438.
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curves and the union’s indifference curves describe the set of Pareto optimal
bargains between the employer and the union and are referred to as the parties’
“contract curve,” labeled C.75 The shape and slope of the contract curve depend
on the technology of the firm and the preferences of the union. However,
assuming that the union values both high wages and the employment of its
members, the contract curve will lie to the right of the employer’s labor
demand curve.76 Assuming that the parties bargain in a Coasean fashion to
exhaust all benefits of trade, one would logically conclude that they will agree
to a wage and employment bargain that is to the right of the demand curve on
the portion of the contract curve between C′ and C″.77 Precisely where on the
contract curve the parties will agree to operate is an indeterminate bargaining
problem. However, under any of the possible solutions between C′ and C″, the
employer will employ more labor after the union wage increase than the
amount specified by the employer’s labor demand curve.78
FIGURE 2: THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT CURVE
 
2. Employer Monopsony Power
Moreover, if the employer enjoys monopsony power in the labor market, it
can be shown that the formation of a union can actually move the employer to a
more efficient wage and level of employment through collective bargaining.79
An employer exercises monopsony power when it employs such a significant
share of the labor in the relevant labor market that it realizes its wage policies
affect the market wage.80 When an employer monopsony exists, the employer
no longer has to accept the market wage as given, but instead realizes that it can
drive down the market wage by employing fewer employees. As characterized
75 Id. See also HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 42, at 16.
76 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 439.
77 Id. To assume that two parties bargain in a Coasean fashion is to assume they bargain
cooperatively to maximize the net benefits of trade. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42–44 (1960).
78 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 439.
79 Id. at 455–56.
80 See DAVEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 307–08.
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in Figure 3, which shows the relevant labor supply curve (S), the employer’s
labor demand curve (D) and marginal cost of labor curve (MCL), the monop-
sonistic employer maximizes profits by employing fewer employees (Lm) and
driving the wage down from Wc to Wm.81 The actions of the monopsonist in
decreasing employment and wages results in production inefficiency because
the monopsonist employs less than the efficient amount of labor in the produc-
tion process. A union can solve this problem because, by fixing the wage for
labor at a given rate, it prevents the monopsonist from driving down wages by
employing fewer workers. Because the monopsonist can no longer drive down
the wage by cutting employment, the monopsonist no longer has incentive to
employ fewer than the efficient number of employees.82 The problem of the
negotiation of a wage between a monopsony employer and a monopoly union
represents an indeterminate bargaining problem, but if one assumes the
employer and the union seek to maximize the monetary value of the rents from
their endeavors, they will bargain to the competitive wage (Wc) and the com-
petitive level of employment (Lc).83 Thus, when facing employer monopsony
power, monopoly unions can increase employment and economic efficiency.
FIGURE 3: A MONOPSONISTIC LABOR MARKET
 
81 The marginal cost of labor curve for the monopsony (MCL) lies above the labor supply curve.
This is because the monopsonist realizes that purchasing additional labor drives up the wage; the
marginal cost of additional labor for the monopsonist equals the increased wage it must pay for
the additional labor plus the increase in wages that must be paid to each previously purchased
unit of labor. Because the height of the labor supply curve is equal to the wage at every level of
employment, the marginal cost of the labor curve must lie above this curve. As depicted in
Figure [2], the monopson[ist] maximizes profits by employing labor until the point where the
marginal cost of labor equals the marginal benefit of labor as represented by the labor demand
curve . . .  (Nm).
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 455–56 n.114.
82
“When confronted by a union, the monopsonist faces a marginal cost of labor curve that
is horizontal at the union wage from the origin until the labor supply curve and then rises
above the labor supply curve.” Id. at 456 n.115.
83 See DAVEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 308–09; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Union, Labor
Market Structure, and the Welfare Implications of the Quality of Work, 1 J. LAB. RES. 175,
179–84, 190 (1980).
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3. Productivity-Enhancing Effects of Unions
There are also a variety of economic theories under which unions and
collective bargaining can increase the productivity of the employees and the
efficiency of their terms and conditions of employment.84 First, unions can
allow employees to make useful contributions in organizing the production pro-
cess and monitoring the work of administrators and managers.85 Employees
have an obvious interest in the success of their employer and the productivity
of their work. Working for a failing employer in a dead-end, unproductive job
is neither fulfilling nor secure. Moreover, employees, and in particular skilled
or educated employees, have important knowledge of the production process
that is useful in planning production to make the enterprise more successful,
including experience with the performance of their managers and administra-
tors.86 For example, it would be silly to try to plan school policies or curricula
without consulting with the teachers who have been trained to educate children
and who are actually involved in the day-to-day running of the schools. Discus-
sions with collective representatives in a union setting are more likely to be
productive than individual discussions because employees will have less fear of
retaliation for reporting administrative failures.87
Second, unions help to promote the negotiation of efficient contract terms.
Many terms and conditions of employment are public goods in that they are the
same for all employees, and an individual employee cannot negotiate improve-
ments without benefiting others. Examples include: common hours of work, the
common method of evaluation, and the general form of medical or pension
benefits.88 Because improvements in these public goods are not exclusive, indi-
vidual employees have too little incentive to negotiate for them, resulting in a
contract for employment that includes too little of these benefits. Unions help
to solve this problem by giving the workers a collective voice through which
they can more accurately represent their preferences on such matters.89 There
are also terms and conditions of employment for which there are important
information costs and asymmetries—for example, health risks on the job and
84 See, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 65, at 7–11; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note
42, at 188–192; Kuhn, supra note 66, at 229; Donald O. Parsons, The Employment Relation-
ship: Job Attachment, Work Effort, and the Nature of Contracts, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 789, 799–810 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986).
85 See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 42, at 188–89; Matthew S. Goldberg, Discrimina-
tion, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials, 97 Q.J. ECON. 307, 308–14 (1982) (elab-
orating on monitoring and the theory of discrimination); Peter Kuhn, Malfeasance in Long
Term Employment Contracts: A New General Model with an Application to Unionism 28–29
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1045, 1982), available at http://www
.nber.org/papers/w1045.pdf?new_window=1.
86 The notion that production workers can contribute knowledge and information to the
firm’s production processes is the basis of the concept of “quality circles” so popular in
Japanese and American management. See generally JOHN L. W. BECKFORD, QUALITY: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (3rd ed. 2010); KAORU ISHIKAWA, WHAT IS TOTAL QUALITY CON-
TROL? THE JAPANESE WAY 5, 138–40 (David J. Lu trans., 1985); W. EDWARDS DEMING,
OUT OF THE CRISIS 47 (MIT Press ed. 2000).
87 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 433.
88 See, e.g., id. at 432–33; FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 65, at 46–47; see also Richard
B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 NAT’L AFF. 69, 71 (1979).
89 Freeman & Medoff, supra note 88, at 70–71.
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the expected value of health and pension benefits. Individually, it is very costly
for employees to collect all of the information necessary to negotiate efficient
terms with respect to these conditions of employment.90 Unions help solve this
problem by hiring experts and taking advantage of economies of scale in col-
lecting and maintaining the necessary information.91
Third, unions help promote the efficient enforcement of express or
implicit contracts. It is often efficient for the employer and employees to make
agreements that are enforceable over considerable periods of time—for exam-
ple, health and pension benefits. Moreover, in both the private and the public
sectors, it is common for employers to pay employees less than their marginal
product early in their careers and more than their marginal product later in their
careers.92 This deferred compensation serves the important purposes of com-
pensating employees for investments in human capital and minimizing
employer monitoring costs.93 Regrettably, such deferred compensation creates
incentives for employers to act opportunistically and fire employees before they
receive their deferred wages, while agreements to defer a portion of compensa-
tion often remain implicit because of the costs of negotiation and enforce-
ment.94 However, they can also be enforced by express terms that act as a
check on the arbitrary discharge of employees later in their careers—for exam-
ple, seniority agreements and just cause clauses. Unions enable the enforcement
of such long-term implicit contracts by protecting employees from employers’
opportunistic behavior with collective action, seniority rules, just-cause provi-
sions, and arbitration provisions.95
Finally, some argue that unions raise productivity by promoting the adjust-
ment of working conditions through the efficient expression of a collective
voice rather than costly exit.96 In competitive labor markets, a worker’s pri-
mary mechanism for expressing dissatisfaction with working conditions is to
take another job or “exit” the firm.97 Individual bargaining over conditions of
90 For information regarding unions and their ability to effectively communicate workplace
protections, see LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHEW WALTERS, ECON. POL’Y INST., HOW
UNIONS HELP ALL WORKERS 11 (2003), available at www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefing
papers/143/bp143.pdf.
91 DAVID MADLAND ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, UNIONS MAKE THE
MIDDLE CLASS: WITHOUT UNIONS, THE MIDDLE CLASS WITHERS 16 (2011), available at
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/unionsmake
themiddleclass.pdf.
92 There is extensive economic literature on implicit labor market contracts. Recent surveys
can be found in Parsons, supra note 84, at 799–802; Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A
Survey, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1144 (1985). See also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at
431–32.
93 Deferred compensation helps minimize monitoring costs because employees who have a
portion of their compensation deferred to later years will be less likely to goof-off, fearing
loss of the later compensation. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 432 n.46.
94 Id. at 432.
95 Id. See also James M. Malcomson, Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency, 93 ECON. J.
51, 52–53 (1983); M.W. Reder, Unionism, Wages, and Contract Enforcement, in RESEARCH
IN LABOR ECONOMICS: NEW APPROACHES TO LABOR UNIONS 27, 46–47 (Joseph D. Reid, Jr.
ed., Supp. II 1983); Kuhn, supra note 85.
96 FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 65, at 7–9, 14–15; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 88,
at 70–74, 76–77.
97 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 38, at 433; FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 65, at 7.
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employment is difficult due to the free-rider effect previously discussed and
because workers do not want to be identified by their employer as “troublemak-
ers.”98 However, exit is an inefficient mechanism by which to encourage
changes in working conditions because it does not communicate what was
wrong with the job and also imposes search and retraining costs on both the
employee and the employer. Unions help solve this problem by giving workers
a collective voice through which they can express dissatisfaction with working
conditions without the problems of free riding or employer retaliation. Besides
being a more effective method of expressing dissatisfaction with working con-
ditions, the collective voice also saves money by reducing the number of work-
ers who leave jobs and, thus, the amount of search and retraining costs.99
4. Unions as an Important Part of a Pluralist Democracy
Last but not least, many have argued that free labor unions are an impor-
tant part of democratic pluralism. Not only do free people, including public
sector employees, have the right to organize to petition the government, in a
society where the interests of capital are so well organized and financed, it is
imperative that workers organize to represent their interests in the legislature.
The services provided by public employees are in direct competition for public
dollars with alternative state purchases or tax breaks, advocated by special
interests or the public at-large.100 These competing interests are well organized
and funded in their lobbying efforts, including advocates for lower taxes and
smaller government in general.101 Attempts to silence public employees or hin-
der their collective public representation102 will bias future debate over the
merits of the services public employees provide.
The fact that public employees have particular interests as employees of
the state should not disqualify them from seeking collective redress from the
government, unless we are also willing to disqualify the other lobbyists with
direct interests—almost every single lobbyist of consequence in Washington
and our state capitals. Indeed, it is probably important that public employees
address their particular interests before the government because they have
direct experience with the benefits their services provide to society and special
expertise and experience on how those services can best be provided and effi-
ciently administered. The fact that these employees also have a personal inter-
est in higher wages and benefits is completely transparent, and the
98 FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 65, at 9.
99 Id. at 8–9, 14–15.
100 See Patrick Michels, Texas Tax Give-Back to Oil Companies Set to Further Drain
School Budget, COLO. INDEP. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://coloradoindependent.com/100681
/texas-tax-give-back-to-oil-companies-set-to-further-drain-school-budget.
101 See SHERK, supra note 41, at 1–2.
102 See, e.g., Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 665 F.3d 1234, 1236, 1239
(11th Cir. 2011); Robert Kahn, State’s Teachers Call New Law Unconstitutional Political
Attack, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.courthousenews.com
/2011/02/28/34492.htm; Susan Martin, State Initiatives Affecting Public Employees’ Collec-
tive Bargaining Rights, A.B.A. SEC. OF LAB. & EMP’T LAW, June 2011, http://www.ameri
canbar.org/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/1106_aball_flash/1106_aball_flash_state_in
itiatives.html.
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compensation they receive is a matter of public record and easily accounted for
in the public debate.103
Finally, public employees also share interests with private sector employ-
ees in the general organization of the employment relationship and society, and
these interests require representation before the government. To disadvantage
public employees in the political debate is to further disadvantage worker inter-
ests relative to the interests of management and capital in the formulation of
our laws and government policies. Even outside of the legislative process, it is
important to have employee organization for the efficient evolution of legal
rules and social norms. Organized groups have “repeat player” advantages and
can better litigate and lobby to establish precedents and social norms.104
Employers are certainly organized to represent their interests in the legislature
and courts, including the court of public opinion. Unless employee interests are
similarly organized in unions, laws, precedents, and social norms will evolve in
favor of employer interests and against employee interests.105
The Positive View of Public Sector Unions and Collective Bargaining
Based on the analysis of unions as a collective voice, progressives argue
that public employee unions are important in ensuring adequate compensation
for public employees, an adequate level of funding for government services, the
efficient provision and administration of government services, and a voice for
employee concerns in the legislative process.106 Thus, they would predict that,
although organization would increase public employee wages and benefits,
compensation would be commensurate to the compensation enjoyed by compa-
rable private sector employees, although a larger portion might be received in
the form of benefits to take advantage of the government’s advantages as an
insurer. They would also predict that states with public employee organization
would have better-funded and administered systems for the provision of gov-
ernment services. Finally, they would argue that the legislative activities of
public employee unions help balance the lobbying activities of other groups,
offering a more balanced perspective on the costs and benefits of government
programs and providing particular expertise, all of which would tend to
improve the outcomes of the legislative process.
Even in an ad hoc analysis, there would seem to be some force behind
these arguments. First, the government would seem to enjoy monopsony power
over a broad array of public employees. Empirical work supports the notion
that the government enjoys monopsony power over schoolteachers and pricing
103 For example, in California, under the California Public Records Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 6250–6270, 6275–6276.48 (2012), all public employee salaries and wages are public
record. You can even search them on-line. Max Hennum, Search for State Worker Salaries,
SACRAMENTO BEE, http://www.sacbee.com/statepay/ (last updated Jan. 27, 2014).
104 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974); see also Paul H. Rubin, Why is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977).
105 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Alternative Economic Analysis of the Regulation of
Unions and Collective Bargaining, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 201, 203, 219 (Margaret Oppenheimer &
Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2005).
106 See supra note 6.
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power with respect to other professionals it commonly employs.107 If this is the
case, the cost-minimizing strategy for the state in providing public services
would be to choke back employment and wages. Even where the government
does not enjoy monopsony power in a labor market, it may acquire the ability
to act opportunistically with respect to its employees. Any public employee
who invests a significant portion of his or her career in acquiring human capital
specific to the workings of that state would seem vulnerable to later opportunis-
tic behavior by the employer. No other employer will reward the public
employee for that investment. In light of this economic power over its employ-
ees, the political nature of the state takes on a different light. State government
can be used as a means for taxpayers or consumers and special interests to take
advantage of public employees for short-term gain by reneging on promises
that have to be enforced over time. It is essential for the efficient enforcement
of long-term agreements with the state that such agreements cannot be undone
with every change in political power.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A. Wages and Benefits
There have been a number of recent empirical studies comparing wages
and benefits in the private and public sector. These studies take two different
strategies to account for the differences between private and public employees
in education and other demographic factors. One strategy is to compare “simi-
lar people” by comparing employees with similar educational levels and other
demographic factors through comparing means for select populations or
through regression analysis.108 Alternatively, an analyst might compare “simi-
lar positions” by comparing what people get paid in the private and public
sector for doing the same job.109 The first strategy is far more common because
there are many occupations that are not well-represented in both the private and
public sectors, and regression analysis allows a fairly sophisticated accounting
of compensation differences between private and public employees.110 Fortu-
nately, the two methods yield similar results.111
Historically, the concern among economists and policy analysts has been
whether public pay was too low rather than too high. In evaluating the early
empirical evidence, Richard Kearney concluded that “[u]ntil the rise of [public
sector] unions . . . in the 1960s and 1970s, public employees were consistently
underpaid relative to similar workers in the private sector.”112 With the advent
of significant public employee representation in the 1970s, economists became
very interested in the comparability of private and public wages and benefits,
107 See generally ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN
LABOR MARKETS (2003).
108 BENDER & HEYWOOD, supra note 16, at 4–5.
109 Id. at 5.
110 Dale Belman & John S. Heywood, Public-Sector Wage Comparability: The Role of
Earnings Dispersion, 32 PUB. FIN. REV. 567, 572–73 (2004).
111 BENDER & HEYWOOD, supra note 16, at 6.
112 RICHARD KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 158 (4th ed. 2009).
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and began trying to compare the wages and benefits of workers in similar pub-
lic and private sector jobs. The results of studies using this methodology varied,
depending on the sample used and the examined worker characteristics.113 Dale
Belman and John Heywood examined variation between private and public
employees across seven states using Current Population Survey data and found
that local government employees earned less than comparable private sector
workers in six of the states, and state employees earned less than comparable
private sector workers in three of the states.114 George Borjas analyzed private
and public sector earnings from the 1960s to 2000 and found that public sector
employees suffered lower pay than comparable private sector employees; in
2000, men earned about six percent less in the public sector, while women
earned about the same in the public sector as the private sector when adjusted
for demographic characteristics.115 In a particularly detailed analysis of differ-
ent worker characteristics, Sang-Hyop Lee used National Longitudinal Survey
data to find that female state employees earned four percent less than compara-
ble private employees and male state employees earned nine percent less than
comparable private employees.116 Greg Lewis and Chester Galloway used
detailed census data to examine pay differentials in all fifty states and found
that both state and local employees were paid less than private employees in
forty-four states.117 They tentatively concluded that “most [state and local gov-
ernments] pay less than private firms in the same state for similar workers.”118
Finally, in perhaps the most complete study comparing pay between occupa-
tions in the private and public sectors, Michael Miller found that private indus-
try paid better for virtually all professional and administrative jobs, but for
technical- and clerical-level employees and blue-collar workers the findings
were mixed.119 Miller’s results suggest that at higher skill levels private
113 Keith A. Bender, The Central Government-Private Sector Wage Differential, 12 J.
ECON. SURVS. 177, 177–78, 181–82 (1998).
114 Dale Belman & John S. Heywood, State and Local Government Wage Differentials: An
Intrastate Analysis, 16 J. LAB. RES. 187, 188–89, 196 tbl.6 (1995).
115 George J. Borjas, Wage Structures and the Sorting of Workers into the Public Sector, in
FOR THE PEOPLE: CAN WE FIX PUBLIC SERVICE? 29, 33 fig.3-2, 34 (John D. Donahue &
Joseph S. Nye Jr. eds., 2003).
116 Sang-Hyop Lee, A Reexamination of Public-Sector Wage Differentials in the United
States: Evidence from the NLSY with Geocode, 43 INDUS. REL. 448, 451, 456 (2004). Female
local government employees also earned four percent less, while male local government
employees earned essentially the same as private sector workers. Id. at 456.
117 Gregory B. Lewis & Chester S. Galloway, A National Analysis of Public/Private Wage
Differentials at the State and Local Levels by Race and Gender 2, 33–34 tbl.5 (Ga. State
Univ., Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies Research Paper Series No. 11-10, 2011), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1768190. Although Lewis and
Galloway report differentials that range from –15.2% (Kansas) to +13.0% (Nevada) and
most state differentials were negative, suggesting that public employees are paid less, most
of the reported differentials were within a few percentage points of zero suggesting public
and private comparability. Id. at 33–34 tbl.5.
118 Id. at 24.
119 Michael A. Miller, The Public-Private Pay Debate: What do the Data Show?, 119
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 18, 18 (1996).
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employees enjoy higher pay, but that at lower skill levels public employees
enjoy higher pay.120
Perhaps the best of the most recent studies on the subject was conducted
by Jeffrey Keefe.121 Keefe used Current Population Survey data (wages) and
Employer Costs of Employee Compensation data (benefits) for the year 2009 to
compare private and public employee compensation across educational levels
and size of firm, while controlling for a variety of worker characteristics
including hours worked, education, experience, organizational size, gender,
race, and disability.122 He found that public employees are paid wages that are
11.47% less than those paid comparable private sector employees.123 Public
employees do indeed enjoy benefits that are a larger share of total compensa-
tion (34.1%) than the average private sector employer, but only marginally
larger than private employees with 500 employees or more (33.1%).124 After
accounting for public employees’ better benefits, Keefe found that they still
were paid total compensation packages worth, on average, 3.74% less than the
compensation packages of comparable private sector employees.125 Keefe
found that the difference between private and public sector compensation
varied according to the employee’s level of education. Public employees with
just a high school education or “some college” earned more than their private
sector counterparts, while public employees with a bachelor’s degree or an
advanced degree earned considerably less.126
Keith Bender and John Heywood have recently confirmed Keefe’s general
findings on a national basis by examining data from several individual states
over a period encompassing almost the last three decades.127 Using Current
120 Of particular relevance to the legal profession, one of the authors has performed regres-
sion analyses controlling for hours of work, years of work experience, grade point average,
and many other variables, and found that fifteen years after graduation, government lawyers
are paid slightly over $127.000 a year less (2004 dollars) than comparable attorneys in large
private firms.  Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, et al., “The Pride of Indiana”: An Empirical Study
of the Law School Experience and Careers of Indiana University School of Law – Blooming-
ton Alumni, 81 IND. L.J. 1427, 1471 (2006); see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Kaushik
Mukhopadhaya, The Fruits of Our Labors: An Empirical Study of the Distribution of Income
and Job Satisfaction Across the Legal Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDU. 342, at 355 (1999)
(government attorneys paid over $98,000 per year less than comparable large private firm
attorneys in 1992 dollars).
121 See generally KEEFE, supra note 19; Keefe, supra note 10.
122 KEEFE, supra note 19, passim.
123 Id. at 10.
124 Id. at 7 tbl.3, 8. Keefe found that benefits constituted 26.3% of total compensation for
private employers with less than 100 employees, 29.8% of total compensation for private
employers with 100 to 499 employees, 33.1% for private employers with 500 or more
employees, and 34.1% for public employers. Id.
125 Id. at 10 tbl.6; see also SCHMITT, supra note 15, at 6 (using CPS data to find that public
employees are paid on average four percent less than comparable private sector employees).
126 KEEFE, supra note 19, at 6 tbl.2. Keefe found that the public private pay differential for
employees with a high school degree was 6%, some college 9%, an associate’s degree 5%, a
bachelor’s degree -25%, a professional degree -37%, a master’s degree -31% and a doctorate
-21%. Id. In a departure from this pattern, Keefe found that public employees without a high
school degree were paid 6% less than their private sector counterparts. Id. See also SCHMITT,
supra note 15, at 6–9 (finding a similar wage leveling in the public sector at the expense of
the more highly educated public employees).
127 BENDER & HEYWOOD, supra note 16, at 3.
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Population Survey data from the years 1983 to 2008, Bender and Heywood
found that the public/private wage differential for state employees nationally
was about -6% in 1983, then close to a little more than -1% in the early 1990s,
but has since expanded to a little more than -11% in the 2000s.128 The public/
private wage differential for local employees showed a similar pattern of first
narrowing and then widening; however, local government employees were con-
sistently paid even less than state employees.129 Bender and Heywood
examined CPS on an individual state basis for the states of California, Texas,
New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and Florida and found similar pat-
terns, although in some states the public/private wage differential was some-
times positive, indicating that the public employees were then paid slightly
more than their private sector counterparts.130 The states where public employ-
ees fared better over the examined period than the national public/private wage
differential of -11.4% were Pennsylvania (-4.5%), Florida (-4.8%), New York
(-7.0%), California (-9.8%), and Michigan (-10.1%). In Illinois (-12.5%) and
Texas (-16.6%), they fared worse than the national average.131
Keefe has also done studies using Current Population Survey data and
Employer Costs for Employee Compensation data to compare public and pri-
vate wages and benefits in particular states for the year 2009. Using these data
sets, Keefe was able to control for differences between public employees and
private employees in education, hours worked, experience, organizational size,
gender, race, and disability. Keefe found that: New Jersey public employees
received 2.25 percent less in wages and 2.43% more in total compensation than
comparable private sector employees, with neither figure being statistically sig-
nificant;132 California public employees received a statistically significant
6.36% less in wages and a statistically insignificant 2.29% more in total com-
pensation than comparable private sector employees;133 and Wisconsin public
employees received 4.8% less in total compensation than comparable private
sector employees in that state.134
128 Id. at 6, 9 fig.1.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 10–13 figs.2–8.
131 Id. at 14 tbl.3.
132 JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 270, ARE NEW JERSEY
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OVERPAID? 1, 4, 10 tbl.6 (2010), available at http://cdm15353.content
dm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15353coll3/id/282.
133 SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO & JEFFREY KEEFE, CTR. ON WAGE AND EMP’T DYNAMICS, THE
TRUTH ABOUT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN CALIFORNIA: THEY ARE NEITHER OVERPAID NOR
OVERCOMPENSATED 11 tbl.5 (2010), available at http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/cwed/wp
/2010-03.pdf.
134 JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POL’Y INST, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 290, ARE WISCONSIN PUB-
LIC EMPLOYEES OVER-COMPENSATED? 1, 9 tbl.4 (2011), available at http://www.epi.org
/page/-/old/briefingpapers/BriefingPaper290.pdf.
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GRAPH 1: PUBLIC SECTOR PAY DIFFERENTIAL 1983-2008
(FROM OLS REGRESSIONS ON CPS DATA)135
Based on the above analyses, it seems safe to say that although union
density in the American economy is much greater in the public sector than in
the private sector,136 public employee unions have not raised the average total
compensation for public employees to a position of parity with the average total
compensation of comparable private sector employees. But what has been the
impact of public sector unions on their members’ wages and benefits in com-
parison with organized private employees and unorganized private employees?
These are in fact quite complex empirical questions made all the more difficult
by inadequate data, measurement error, unexplained variance, challenging
problems in research design and the “threat effect” that union organization can
increase non-union wages.137 Although there is not as much recent empirical
work on these questions as there is on the public/private pay differential,138 the
work that does exist seems to suggest that public sector unions raise both their
members’ wages and benefits by a modest amount, but not by as much as pri-
vate sector unions raise their members’ wages and benefits.139 Also like their
private sector counterparts, public sector unions tend to have a leveling impact
on wages, reducing income disparities between men and women and majority
135 BENDER  & HEYWOOD, supra note 16.
136 The percent of employees organized in the public sector is currently around thirty-six
percent, while the percent of employees organized in the private sector is currently around
eight percent. DAU-SCHMIDT et al., supra note 21, at 85–86.
137 KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 162–64.
138 The wage and benefit impact of public sector unions is a very complex empirical ques-
tion, made all the more difficult by inadequate data, measurement error, unexplained vari-
ance, challenging problems in research design and the “threat effect” that union organization
can increase non-union wages. Id.
139 Id. at 161.
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workers and minority workers, and also reducing differences between high and
low paid employees.140
Studies have been done on the impact of collective bargaining on particu-
lar types of public employees, and public employees in general. Much attention
has been paid to the impact of collective bargaining on K-12 teachers’ salaries
and benefits because teachers constitute a large percentage of government
employees and are often in the public eye.141 The available studies seem to
indicate that the mean wage effect of teachers’ unions was about five percent in
the 1960s and about seven percent from the 1970s through the 1990s.142
Despite this wage effect, teachers’ salaries barely kept pace with inflation and
rose less than other full-time employees during the economic boom years of the
1990s.143 Less research exists on police and firefighters, but the work that does
exist suggests that organized police enjoy a salary advantage of four percent to
eight percent, which peaked around 1977 and has declined since then.144
Organized police also enjoy more benefits.145 With respect to state employees,
early work showed a combined wage and benefits advantage for union workers
of around four percent,146 while more recent work places the advantage at
about seven percent.147 After surveying the relevant work, Richard Kearney
140 Id. at 161–62.
141 ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SOME BASIC FACTS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORKERS 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms
/?fa=view&id=3410.
142 KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 164–65.
143 Id. at 164. Craig Olson has analyzed data on Wisconsin teachers’ salaries and found that
they continued to lag behind the private sector over the entire period of 1995–2009. Olson,
supra note 17.
144 KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 165. See also Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Gerald S. Goldstein,
A Model of Public Sector Wage Determination, 2 J. URB. ECON. 223, 233 (1975) (finding
that 1967 earnings for unionized municipal employees were greater than those of non-union-
ized municipal employees by between 2 and 16 percent); Peter Feuille & John Thomas
Delaney, Collective Bargaining, Interest Arbitration, and Police Salaries, 39 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 228, 229 (1986) (finding that collective bargaining and the availability of interest
arbitration tend to have a positive effect on police salaries); W. Clayton Hall & Bruce
Vanderporten, Unionization, Monopsony Power, and Police Salaries, 16 INDUS. REL. 94,
100 (1977) (finding that police salaries are modestly increased by collective negotiations);
Richard C. Kearney & David R. Morgan, The Effect of Employee Organizations on the
Compensation of Police Officers, 9 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 17, 18
(1980). Compare Timothy D. Chandler & Rafael Gely, Protective Service Unions, Political
Activities, and Bargaining Outcomes, 5 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 295, 295 (1995)
(finding that differences between union and non-union police wages decrease when control-
ling for union political activity), with Stephen J. Trejo, Public Sector Unions and Municipal
Employment, 45 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 166, 166 (1991) (finding that positive correlation
between municipal employment and union formation involves economies of scale and is not
totally dependent on union’s political clout).
145 KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 165; Peter Feuille et al., Police Bargaining, Arbitration,
and Fringe Benefits, 6 J. LAB. RES. 1, 2 (1985); William J. Hunter & Carol H. Rankin, The
Composition of Public Sector Compensation: The Effects of Unionization and Bureaucratic
Size, 9 J. LAB. RES. 29, 29–30 (1988).
146 Cf. Richard C. Kearney & David R. Morgan, Unions and State Employee Compensa-
tion, 12 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 115, 116 (1980) (noting lower level increases of 1–4 per-
cent in one study, 7.3% in another study, and the statistics behind such calculations).
147 Dale Belman et al., Public Sector Earnings and the Extent of Unionization, 50 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 610, 620 (1997).
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concluded that, although the union advantage in the public sector has varied
over time and among occupations and geographic regions, “[t]he best estimate
of an overall union effect [in the public sector] is probably 5 to 6 percent.”148
This is considerably less than the usual 10 to 15 percent compensation advan-
tage attributed to unions in the private sector.149 Given these findings, it seems
that, on average, the most that one could reasonably expect of collective bar-
gaining in the public sector is that it would help public employees reach a
rough parity in compensation with private sector employees.
B. Productivity
As previously discussed,150 there are divergent views on the impact of
unions on the productivity of public employees and the efficiency of the agen-
cies which employ their members. Detractors argue that unions impose high
wages, resulting in inefficient production and consumption.151 They also argue
that unions impose inefficient work rules and interfere with management’s flex-
ibility in determining how to undertake production.152 Alternatively, supporters
of collective bargaining argue that higher wages attract superior workers and
decrease turnover costs, increasing productivity.153 Moreover, they argue that
public sector unions sometimes counter employer monopsony power and can
raise efficiency by raising wages and employment closer to efficient levels.154
Supporters also argue that unions provide employees with a collective voice so
that they can act as an effective monitor of management, make positive contri-
butions to improving productivity, negotiate and enforce efficient contract
terms, and further reduce turnover.155 These arguments would seem particu-
larly true where the employees are professional employees, well-trained in the
conduct of their craft—for example, teachers. Much less empirical work has
been done on these questions, but there are some relevant empirical findings to
discuss.
The primary argument that unions promote inefficiency is that unions raise
wages to inefficient levels, thus causing inefficient production and consump-
tion. Since public sector unions typically achieve only a rough parity with com-
parable private sector workers in the total compensation their members receive,
148 KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 166.
149 Id.; see also H. GREGG LEWIS, UNION RELATIVE WAGE EFFECTS: A SURVEY 153 (1986)
(reviewing studies and finding average difference between private and public sector union
wage effect of 13%); David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have
on Wages Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 383, 391
(2004) (finding that private sector union wage effect decreased between 1983–88 and
1996–2001 from 21.5% to 17.0% while public sector union wage effect increased from
13.3% to 14.5%).
150 See supra Part III.A–B.
151 See Elise Foley, Mitch Daniels: Public-Sector Unions Shouldn’t Exist, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/10/mitch-daniels-unions-public-sector
-unions_n_1584396.html (last updated June 10, 2012, 11:05 AM).
152 Cf. id. (quoting Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels as saying that with unionization, “gov-
ernment becom[es] its own special interest group”).
153 See BORJAS, supra note 64, at 451.
154 See id.
155 See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 69; see also supra Part III.B.
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it would seem that there is little, if any, inefficiency caused by public sector
union wages. Indeed, Richard Kearney has observed that, at least among teach-
ers, public sector unions have been more concerned with maintaining or
increasing employment than increasing wages.156 This behavior seems more
consistent with the argument posed by proponents of collective bargaining that
public sector unions bargain with a monopsonist employer and can increase
efficiency by increasing both wages and employment.157 Increasing the number
of teachers lowers the student-to-teacher ratio, a primary determinant of the
effectiveness of our schools.158 Detractors might argue that our schools employ
too many teachers, and unions make this problem worse, but this argument is
increasingly difficult to make and I have yet to see it cogently articulated. Thus,
by trying to maintain or increase teacher employment, it would seem that teach-
ers’ unions seek to improve school efficiency.
On the question of whether public sector unions impose inefficient work
rules, the current debate has been replete with numerous anecdotes but very
short on hard empirical evidence.159 Detractors of collective bargaining have
argued that unions decrease efficiency by: negotiating seniority and just cause
provisions which limit the employer’s discretion in discharging or laying off
employees; resisting merit pay provisions that could encourage employee pro-
ductivity; and resisting technological or other changes that impact employ-
ment.160 For example, in the Indiana debate over teacher collective bargaining,
Republicans argued that seniority rules in collective agreements were ineffi-
cient because they required schools to lay off meritorious younger teachers and
retain less meritorious senior teachers.161 Furthermore, they argued that merit
pay was necessary to encourage increased teacher productivity.162 As a result,
the legislature adopted, and Governor Mitch Daniels signed, a statute restricting
seniority provisions and requiring merit pay.163 But these arguments ignore that
there are costs as well as benefits to such provisions. Seniority provisions are
common in both the public and private sectors, even among unorganized
156 See KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 164–65.
157 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
158 David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Labor Market Effects of School Quality: Theory and
Evidence, in DOES MONEY MATTER?: THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS 97, 106–07 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996); Alex Molnar et
al., Evaluating the SAGE Program: A Pilot Program in Targeted Pupil-Teacher Reduction
in Wisconsin, 21 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 165, 166, 177 (1999).
159 See, e.g., Deanna Martin, Indiana Panel OKs Bill Limiting Teacher Bargaining, BLOOM-
BERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 27, 2011, 9:23 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews
/D9L0NVH00.htm.
160 See John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and
Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 72, 73, 96–97, 100 (1989) (concluding
that a negative effect on productivity from unions has not definitely been proved, but “the
contention that unions, on average, significantly raise productivity cannot be sustained”).
161 Cf. Associated Press, Lawmakers Start Work on Teacher Merit Pay Bill, IBJ.COM (Feb.
9, 2011), http://www.ibj.com/lawmakers-start-work-on-teacher-merit-pay-bill/PARAMS
/article/25208.
162 See id.
163 Dan Carden, Daniels Signs Teacher Merit Pay into Law, NWI POLITICS (Apr. 30, 2011,
12:15 PM), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_7bd64dab-6955
-5032-b4ed-b0a9a567d2a1.html. See Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4 (2011) as amended by P.L. 48-
2011, SEC.14;  Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4.5 (2011) as added by P.L. 48-2011, SEC 15.
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employers.164 This is because seniority provisions allow employers to make
credible promises to pay deferred wages that promote efficient monitoring and
efficient employee investment in human capital.165 Without seniority provi-
sions, future school administrators will be tempted to meet short-run budgeting
constraints by reneging on long term implicit contracts and laying off senior
workers, not because they aren’t good employees, but merely because their
wages are higher due to deferred compensation. While such opportunism may
meet short term budgeting demands, in the long-run it will discourage good
teachers from entering the profession. Although some use of merit pay may be
useful, the idea of merit pay was rejected by school boards nationwide in the
1950s, well before teacher organization, because it was subject to racial and
gender discrimination and favoritism.166 There are costs as well as benefits to
administrative discretion and it is not an easy question whether greater adminis-
trative control will increase or decrease public sector productivity. In the case
of deferred compensation and seniority, or indeed any efficient contract over
time, it is important that the terms and conditions of public employment be
insulated from immediate response to changing political winds. Whether
restrictions on administrative discretion decrease or increase public employee
productivity and the efficiency of their agencies is an empirical question.
Despite the difficulty of measuring productivity in service industries,167
several scholars have tried to measure the impact of unions on productivity in
the public sector. One of the few straightforward measures of productivity in
services is the mortality rate of heart attack patients in hospitals. In a 2004
study, Michael Ash and Jean Seago found that unionization in public hospitals
led to significantly lower mortality rates.168 Consistent with this, in an earlier
study Charles Register found that unionization leads to increased productivity
in public hospitals based on more mundane measures of patient care.169
The effect of unionization on teacher productivity has been fairly exten-
sively studied, primarily using student test scores as the indicator of productiv-
ity. The results have been mixed. In one of the earliest studies, Randall Eberts
and Joe Stone found that, after correcting for various factors, unionized public
schools enjoyed student test scores that were three percent higher overall, and
seven percent higher for average students.170 These union-positive results were
164 Daniel B. Cornfield, Seniority, Human Capital, and Layoffs: A Case Study, 21 INDUS.
REL. 352, 352 (1982); Katharine G. Abraham & James L. Medoff, Length of Service and
Layoffs in Union and Nonunion Work Groups, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 87, 87 (1984);
Sangheon Lee, Seniority as an Employment Norm: The Case of Layoffs and Promotion in the
US Employment Relationship, 2 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 65, 66 (2004).
165 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
166 See Randall Eberts et al., Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes, 37 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 913, 913 (2002).
167 See KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 208; Lori Taylor, Economic Approaches to School
Efficiency, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 210 (Dominic J. Brewer & Patrick J. McEwan
eds., 2010).
168 Michael Ash & Jean Ann Seago, The Effect of Registered Nurses’ Unions on Heart-
Attack Mortality, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 422, 422 (2004).
169 Charles A. Register, Wages, Productivity, and Costs in Union and Nonunion Hospitals,
9 J. LAB. RES. 325, 329–30 (1988).
170 Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public
Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 354, 362 (1987).
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first hotly contested by Michael Kurth,171 but then supported by later rework of
the same data by Howard Nelson and Jewell Gould.172 In her 1996 study, Caro-
line Hoxby found that teachers’ unions increased school budgets and improved
the student-teacher ratio, but had no positive impact on student test scores.173
Both before and after Hoxby, several studies found positive effects on teacher
productivity from unionization,174 while others have found negative effects.175
If any pattern emerges from this collection of results, it seems to be that the
unionization of teachers increases the test scores of average students, but has
little effect on the test scores of the highest and lowest performers in schools,
and may even hurt the performance of low-performing students.176 It is also
quite plausible that, as in the private sector, the impact of unionization on pro-
ductivity in the public sector depends on the attitude of the parties. If manage-
ment and the union are recalcitrant and fight, productivity goes down; but, if
the parties negotiate and work cooperatively, productivity can increase.177
V. CONCLUSION
These have been contentious times in the long-running debate over the
merits of public sector collective bargaining. After several decades in which the
question seemed largely settled in favor of a system of collective consultation
with recourse to neutral mediation, fact-finding, or arbitration (but largely with-
out a right to strike) at the state and federal level, the question has now been
reopened in the debate over how to respond to the recent decline in private
employment prospects and government revenue. Although the detractors of
public sector collective bargaining have alleged that this institution has resulted
171 Michael M. Kurth, Teachers’ Unions and Excellence in Education: An Analysis of the
Decline in SAT Scores, 8 J. LAB. RES. 351, 351 (1987).
172 F. Howard Nelson & Jewell C. Gould, Comment, Teachers’ Unions and Excellence in
Education, 9 J. LAB. RES. 379, 379 (1988).
173 See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers’ Unions Affect Education Production, 111
Q.J. ECON. 671, 671, 695, 700–01, 707 (1996).
174 See Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School
Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS
UNIONIZE 305, 317 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988); HOWARD NELSON
& MICHAEL ROSEN, INST. FOR WISCONSIN’S FUTURE, ARE TEACHERS’ UNIONS HURTING
AMERICAN EDUCATION? 4 (1996); Laura M. Argys & Daniel I. Rees, Unionization and
School Productivity: A Reexamination, 14 RES. LAB. ECON. 49, 49–68 (1995); F. Charles A.
Register & Paul W. Grimes, Collective Bargaining, Teachers, and Student Achievement, 12
J. LAB. RES. 99, 106–07 (1991); Lala Carr Steelman et al., Do Teacher Unions Hinder
Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 437, 448 (2000); Harris L. Zwerling & Terry Thomason, The Effects of Teacher
Unions on the Probability of Dropping Out of High School, 23 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIA-
TIONS PUB. SECTOR 239, 239 (1994).
175 Randall W. Eberts, Union Effects on Teacher Productivity, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
346, 346 (1984); Mark Meador & Stephen J. K. Walters, Unions and Productivity: Evidence
from Academe, 15 J. LAB. RES. 373, 373 (1994).
176 KEARNEY, supra note 112, at 209–10; Morley Gunderson, Two Faces of Union Voice in
the Public Sector, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE, 401, 412
(James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007); Katharine Strunk, The Economics of
Teachers Unions in the United States, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION, supra note 167, at 288.
177 See HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 42, at 203–04.
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in public sector wages and benefits far out-pacing private sector compensation,
as well as significant inefficiencies in government administration, neither of
these claims seems warranted by the existing empirical literature. When taking
into account important differences between the public and private sectors,
including public employees’ comparatively higher education levels, recent
empirical work suggests that collective bargaining has allowed public employ-
ees to, at best, keep pace with private sector compensation (although, predict-
ably, public sector employees take a larger share of their compensation in
benefits). Similarly, although there is much less work on the subject, the
existing empirical research makes it clear that unions typically do not have
substantial negative effects on public employee productivity, and may even
raise productivity in some cases. Moreover, there is evidence that public sector
unions can have a beneficial impact on the programs in which their members
work in highlighting the benefits of those programs and ensuring more ade-
quate funding. Although the positive view of public sector collective bargain-
ing that previously prevailed in American public policy is not always strictly
true, it seems to much more closely track the available empirical work than the
older negative view that has since reemerged in American state politics.
